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Running head: Job Characteristics and the Gender Wage Gap
Abstract
This paper re-examines gender wage differences, taking into account not only worker
characteristics but also job characteristics. Consideration of a wide set of “job quality”
indicators can explain a fraction of the wage gap that would otherwise be attributed to pure
wage discrimination. In any case, the fraction of the wage gap that remains associated to
differential rewards for identical factors across sexes is still substantial. Our results suggest
that in order to avoid overestimation of the fraction of the wage gap attributable to
discrimination, it is necessary to control for job characteristics.
Keywords: wage differentials
JEL classification: J7, C4
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1. Introduction
In most gender wage gap evaluations, the analysis has focused on the worker
characteristics associated with different wages for men and women, independently of the type
of job done. This paper proposes a complementary approach, asking if and by how much the
same job characteristic is rewarded differently for men and women. If wages are related to
productivity, and productivity influences promotion up the job ladder, then some job
characteristics will have explanatory power in addition to individual proxies for productivity,
such as education. Indeed, many critiques in the literature on wage discrimination focus on
the fact that in wage regressions, sex dummy variables (or alternatively, the differences in
coefficients in separate regressions for men and women) are just picking up the effect of
unobserved productivity differentials between genders. The analysis in this paper intends to
disentangle these effects by means of enriching the specification of the wage equation to
account for job characteristics.
Our approach is related to that adopted in studies addressing the issue of occupational
segregation in that we intend to control for the fact that assignment of women to jobs is not
the same as that of men. Indeed, the majority of studies on segregation find that part of the
wage gap may be explained by the fact that women tend to concentrate in low wage
occupations. However, even after controlling for segregation, Miller (1987b) and Hernández
(1996) find that there remains a substantial proportion of unexplained wage differences. One
hypothesis arising from their results is that there is further (unobserved) segregation within
each of the considered occupations. The difficulty of testing this hypothesis is rooted in the
fact that information on job characteristics is usually scarce in labour surveys. This study uses
information from a database, the “Encuesta sobre Estructura, Conciencia y Biografía de
Clase” (1991), comprising responses to a series of questions designed to capture precisely the
job characteristics related to the commonly “unobserved” job segregation mentioned above.
The idea motivating inclusion of these variables in a wage gap decomposition exercise
is clear: if, once job characteristics have been fully taken into account, there is no unexplained
wage gap then the discrimination hypothesis will appear less likely. Whether access to these
job characteristics is itself a result of differential treatment of men and women in promotion
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and job assignment is, of course, another issue. If, on the contrary, one finds differential
rewards for the same job characteristic, then our inference will be quite the opposite.1
We specify a model accounting for the fact that the wage equation can have sample
selection problems due to participation and that individuals sort themselves into different
occupations. Wages are determined by several job characteristics and individual variables
such as age and education. From the model estimates, we shall implement the wage
decomposition procedure proposed by Neumark (1988). Given the presence of two selection
processes in our model, we shall pay special attention to how decompositions of the wage gap
need to be carried out in the presence of non random assignment to different groups in the
labour market. In particular we shall follow the procedures proposed by Neuman and Oaxaca
(1998) in carrying out the decompositions.
Our results suggest that job characteristics are important factors in explaining wages
even when controlling for individual characteristics. Moreover, when we account for job
characteristics, the fraction of the gender wage gap attributable to differential rewards for men
and women is reduced, reflecting the fact that men tend to be assigned to the “best” jobs.
However, there remains a substantial and significant “discriminatory” component, in that the
reward for job and individual characteristics is higher for men.
In section 2 we present the econometric model. Section 3 comprises discussion of the
data set. The empirical results are presented in section 4, while, finally, section 5 concludes.
                                                          
1 This study is also related to studies such as Bayard et al (1999) and De la Rica and Felgueroso (2001) which
control for the proportion of females within each occupational class, each industry and each firm. Also, work by
Johnson and Solon (1986), Sorensen (1990) and Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) show that wages are negatively
associated with the proportion of women within the worker’s occupational class.
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2. The econometric model
The objective is to estimate wage equations for both males and females in order to
decompose the observed wage gap into its discrimination component and the part attributable
to the different observed male and female characteristics. As usual, to obtain consistent
estimates for the wage equation we have to control for the potential selectivity problem
generated by the fact that wages are only observed for those who are participants.2
Additionally, we also wish to control for the fact that having a particular occupation can also
be endogenous, in the sense that the unobserved factors affecting the choice of occupation
may be related to the unobserved productivity in the wage equation. Consequently, the model
we are considering comprises three equations. The endogenous variables of these equations
are w, L, and I, where w is the logarithm of the wage, L is a binary indicator for participation
in the labour market and I is a categorical variable signalling occupation group. I and w are
only observed when L is equal to one, i.e., when the individual is a worker. The model can be
written as:
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where X, Y and Z are vectors of explanatory variables for each equation and u, η and νj are the






























                                                          
2 Méndez and Hernández (2001) analyse the sample selection bias that could arise in the estimation of an
earnings equation in economies where unemployment is a relevant feature of the labour market, as is the case in
Spain. The differences between non-participant and unemployed people point to a double sample selection
mechanism.
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In order to estimate the model above we assume a probit structure for the participation
equation (2) and a multinomial logit structure for the occupation equation (3). We estimate the
wage equation (1) separately for females and males by OLS. In order to account for the
selectivity and endogeneity issues mentioned above we include correction terms following the
procedures proposed by Heckman (1979)3 and Lee (1983), but, except for the constant term,
















































































where Φ(⋅) y φ(⋅) are the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of  the standard normal distribution, respectively.
                                                          
3 The majority of studies that analyse the relationship between wages and occupations do not correct for potential
selectivity biases. See Trost and Lee (1984), Miller (1987a and 1987b), Reilly (1991) and Hernández (1996),




















3. Data and variables
Our estimating sample is extracted from the Encuesta sobre Estructura, Conciencia y
Biografía de Clase (1991).4 This survey contains abundant information about socio-economic
variables and it is unique, at least as far as the Spanish labour market is concerned, in the
sense that it contains a great deal of information on job characteristics.
The endogenous variable in the wage equation (1) is the (log) hourly wage and that of
the participation equation (2) is a discrete variable taking the value 1 if the observation
corresponds to a worker and 0 otherwise. On the other hand, when defining the occupational
groups corresponding to the endogenous variable in equation (3), we have followed the
official classification of occupations in Spain (Clasificacíón Nacional de Ocupaciones, 1979)
with some slight changes due to small samples for some of the original cells. Namely, the
classification we use is the following:
Occupation 1: Technicians, Directing staff in the public and private sector
Occupation 2: Administrative staff
Occupation 3: Sales representatives and retail staff
Occupation 4: Restaurant and hotel staff
Occupation 5: Agriculture, fisheries and mining, and manual industrial workers.
The explanatory variables used in the different equations are defined as follows:
Age: Number of years
Seniority: Number of years in the present job
Indefinite contract: Dummy variable equal to one when the individual has an
indefinite contract.
Education: Dummy variables for the following educational levels: illiterate, primary
school, secondary school, vocational training, university degree (intermediate) and
university degree (higher).
Years of education
Married: Dummy variable equal to one if the individual is married.
                                                          
4 The survey was carried out by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, the Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid and
the Instituto de la Mujer. See Carabaña et al. (1992) for more detailed information.
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Head of the household: Dummy variable equal to one if the individual is the head of
the household.
Number of children
Number of dependent adults
Number of income earners
Industrial sector: Dummy variables corresponding to classification in 12 sectors we
have defined.
Region: Dummy variables for each of the 17 Spanish regions (comunidades
autónomas)
Gross wage control: Dummy variable equal to one when reported wages are gross
wages.
Regarding job characteristics, we have distinguished five blocks of variables: i) those
related to the degree of worker autonomy in setting the working pace within the workplace, ii)
those related to the degree of control by others over the worker’s output, iii) those related to
the degree of supervisory/directive powers over other employees, iv) those related to the
power to decide on issues related to other employees and v) those related to the education
mismatch. The definition of the specific variables included in each of these groups is
presented in Table 1. Unless otherwise specified, these are binary indicators (Yes=1; No=0).
(TABLE 1)
Table A.1 in the Appendix contains descriptive statistics of all the variables used in
the empirical analysis for wage earners split by gender. The average male hourly wage is
14.31% higher than that for women.5 On average, men have also accumulated more seniority
(11.01 versus 7.67 years) and are more likely to have an indefinite (non fixed-term) contract
than women. There are also noteworthy differences between men and women in educational
levels and sectoral concentration. Firstly, the level of education would appear to be higher for
women than for men and, secondly, we find that women are more likely to work in the Public
Administration, the so-called “Reproduction” sector (teaching, scientific research and health
                                                          
5 When making the wage decompositions we will approximate this differential by the difference of the (log)
wages, which is 13.54%.
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care) and the Social Services and Domestic Work sector. We also observe that men are more
likely to be in occupation 5 whereas women mainly seem to cluster in occupations 1 and 2.6
As for the variables related to job characteristics, we find that men occupy the
majority of directive and supervising positions. Up to 7.5% of employed men occupy these
positions as opposed to only 2.2% of women. Also, while more than 15.7% of men carry out
supervision tasks, only 11.5% of women do so.
                                                          




The explanatory variables included in the reduced form participation equation are age
and its square, marital status, worker education and education of partner, whether the
individual is the head of the household, number of children, number of dependent adults,
number of income earners in the household and regional dummies. The estimation results are
reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix. As expected, there are substantially different patterns
for the participation equations of both males and females. Education has a more important and
significant effect for females. The number of children has a negative and significant effect on
female participation, whereas for males the effect is positive, although not significant. This
result is similar to the effect of being married, which is negative, although not significant at a
5% significance level.
The vector of explanatory variables in the occupation equation includes individual age,
years of education, years of education of father and marital status. The estimation results are
reported in Table A.3 of the Appendix. The number of years of education is the most relevant
explanatory factor for occupational choices. There are some differences between males and
females models, although the patterns are similar.
We use the estimates of the participation and occupation equations to construct the
correction terms to be included in the wage equations. We consider four different
specifications for the wage equation which have a common set of variables but differ on
inclusion/exclusion of some individual characteristics and/or job characteristics.
The set of common variables are: having an indefinite contract, seniority, the type of
occupation7 and gross wage control plus correction terms. The group of additional individual
characteristics includes age and its square, educational level, industrial sector and region. The
first two variables try to capture aspects related to productivity not considered in job
evaluation, because they are individual not job characteristics, and the last two try to capture
industrial and geographical differentials in wages. Finally, the set of variables related to job
characteristics, which are taken into account in a job evaluation process, are as defined in
Table 1 in the previous section.
                                                          
7 These dummies are included to allow for different constant terms depending on the occupation, as mentioned
above.
10
Model 1 includes the common set of variables plus those related to individual
characteristics and will correspond to a standard specification of a wage equation in the
analysis of gender wage discrimination. Model 2 also includes the variables related to job
characteristics. By comparing models 1 and 2 we can evaluate the importance of job
characteristics in the determination of wages and compare to what extent differences in the
characteristics of the jobs occupied by males and females explain part of the observed wage
gap. Models 3 and 4 have the same specification as models 1 and 2, respectively, but exclude
the set of variables corresponding to individual characteristics. The estimation of models 3
and 4 will allow us to assess the importance of considering job characteristics when analysing
gender wage discrimination in a context where the explanatory factors are basically those
considered in job evaluation and those which can have an effect on wages through specific
wage complements, such as seniority or having an indefinite contract. Additionally, we will
be able to assess again the impact of individual characteristics on wages, but for a different
reference model.
In Table 2 we present the estimates from the four specifications of the wage equation
for both males and females. Having an indefinite contract brings a higher reward for females,
although the difference is almost insignificant when not including the standard wage equation
variables apart from the common variables. The effect of the experience in the current firm
and also the overall experience proxied by age is more important for males than for females.
The effect of education on wages is more significant for males than for females. By
comparing models 1 and 2, we can infer a positive association between having a higher
educational level and better job characteristics. On the other hand, there seems to be more
variability of wages across industries for females.
Differences in wages due to type of occupation are reduced when age, education and
the sectoral and regional dummies are included, in particular for males. In fact, there are no
significant differences between the type of occupation for males in the model and the most
complete specification (Model 2), although significant differences are found for females in all
four models considered.
Including job characteristics in the wage equation increases the explanatory power of
the model significantly. In the case of females, when we test for the joint significance of the
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job characteristic coefficients, we obtain an F statistic of 2.53 when comparing models 1 and
2, and 3.47 when comparing models 3 and 4, above the corresponding critical value (1.75) at
a 5% significance level. In the case of the male equations, these values are 8.13 and 11.29,
respectively, indicating that job characteristics have a more substantial effect on wages than in
the case of females.
Variables related to the degree of autonomy have a higher (and significant) effect in
the case of males. Also, a component of directive power over employees and power to make
decisions on employee wages, is associated with higher wages for males.8 Finally, being
overeducated in terms of the educational requirements of the job has a positive and significant
reward for females but has no effect on male wages.
Notice that when comparing models 2 and 4, i.e., when testing the significance of
excluding the other individual characteristics in the most general model (Model 2), we obtain
an F statistic of 4.92 for females, which is higher than the 2.53 obtained when comparing
models 2 and 1, i.e., the significance of excluding the job characteristics in Model 2. We find
the opposite result for males, an F statistic of 6.07 when comparing models 2 and 4 and 8.13
when comparing models 2 and 1. This means that the average increase in the residual sum of
squares per each extra parameter not estimated is higher for the other individual
characteristics for females, whereas in the case of males it is higher for the job
characteristics.9
(TABLE 2)
                                                          
8 Notice that the negative and almost significant coefficient for this latter variable in the case of females is due to
the very few cases in the female subsample with a job of these characteristics, as can be seen from the
descriptive statistics in Table A.1.
9 If we look at the adjusted R2 the reduction is smaller for both males and females when excluding the job
characteristics. This does not contradict the F statistics analysis because the number of restrictions is different.
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The model estimates can be used to implement the wage decomposition procedure
proposed by Neumark (1988). This method is a generalisation of those proposed by Oaxaca
(1973) and Blinder (1973), which does not assume either the male or the female wage
structure as the non discriminatory ideal. Instead, the latter is obtained from an estimation
using the joint sample.
In short, this procedure decomposes the difference between average (log)wages for
men and women into differences in observable characteristics and differences in rewards for
these characteristics. In our case, given the existence of the correction terms, this wage gap





























































































where b̂  is the Neumark estimator for the vector of coefficients associated to Xi and bσ̂  and
bϕ̂  are the estimates for the parameters associated to λi and (φ /F)i. The indices m and f refer
to the subsample of men and women respectively. The first element on the right hand side of
the last equation represents the part of the wage gap that can be explained by different
attributes of men and women whereas the second term represents the “unexplained” part of
the wage gap, that is, the part usually attributed to gender discrimination, which arises from a
differential reward for the same observable characteristics.10
We follow one of the possibilities presented in Neuman and Oaxaca (1998) and
consider differences in the coefficients for the selection terms (participation and occupation)
as manifestations of discrimination. The differences in the average values of these terms are
considered as differences in characteristics. However, as Neuman and Oaxaca indicate, a
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discriminatory component could be extracted from this: the difference between the correction
term for females and what it would be if the parameters that govern their selection process
were the same as those for males. In this case, the part attributed to discrimination would be
greater than our estimation.
In Table 3 we present the decomposition of the observed wage gap between males and
females (13.54%) in the two terms mentioned above: the part corresponding to differences in
characteristics and the part corresponding to discrimination.
(TABLE 3)
Notice that when using the specifications without the job characteristics (models 1 and
3), the proportion of the wage gap which can be considered as discrimination exceeds 100%.11
There are no substantial differences associated with inclusion or exclusion of the rest of the
individual characteristics (Model 1 vs Model 3, Model 2 vs Model 4). However, when
including the job characteristics as explanatory factors in the wage equation the proportion of
the wage gap attributable to discrimination is reduced, although there is still a large portion of
the wage gap which cannot be explained by either individual differences or differences in job
characteristics (84.7% in Model 2 and 80.9% in Model 4).
                                                                                                                                                                                    
10 Decomposition of the sample selection correction terms follows the procedures laid out in Neuman and
Oaxaca (1998).
11 Similar results are obtained by De la Rica and Ugidos (1995) using a data set from the same survey.
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5. Summary
In this paper we have attempted to examine the gender wage gap under the assumption
that in addition to individual worker characteristics, job features also contribute to explaining
wage differences. Our strategy was to enrich the traditional wage equation specification with
an ample set of indicators accounting for important job characteristics. As expected, the
results for the sequence of models that we have estimated confirm that these characteristics
explain a significant proportion of wage variation. Moreover, once these characteristics are
taken into account, the portion of the wage gap attributable to discrimination is reduced. This
reflects the fact that a higher proportion of men attain positions of greater responsibility,
autonomy, degree of control over work processes etc. than women. However, our estimates
also suggest that women are rewarded differentially when they achieve these positions too.
These findings are important in that they support the view that, in the Spanish labour
market, differential rewards exist for men and women even when they do the same job, i.e.,
there is pure wage discrimination. This complements previous Spanish evidence showing that
men and women with equal characteristics (but not necessarily doing the same job) received
different wages. A number of issues merit further research and they all have to do with the
fact that even with this data set it is impossible to find a perfect case-control situation. The
first issue is that the set of characteristics controlled for does not include all relevant work
characteristics. The standard job evaluation methods suggest many variables that could pick
up relevant characteristics, but unfortunately our data set does not include them. Also, the
answers in our data set are provided by the worker and, as such, there may be a certain degree
of subjectivity. One way to overcome these shortcomings would be construction of databases
which record all relevant worker characteristics, possibly within the firm itself.
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Table 1: Definition of the job characteristic variables
Variables related to the worker’s autonomy
Own work: Can make decisions on important aspects of own work
Working pace: Can reduce working pace in working day
Working hours: Can make decisions on working hours
Variables related to the degree of control by others over the worker’s output
Quality control: Degree of control over output quality (1: very easy 2: quite easy. 3: easy. 4: not easy at all)
Quantity control: Degree of control over output quantity (1: very easy 2: quite easy. 3: easy. 4: not easy at all)
Variables related to the degree of supervisory/directive power over other employees
Director: Director position
Supervisor: Supervisor position
Variables related to the employee's power to make decisions related to other employees
Raising a worker’s salary: Maximum influence in the decision to raise a worker’s salary.
Penalising a worker: Maximum influence in penalising a worker.
Changing methods: To make decisions regarding changes in the procedures or basic working methods
Variables related to the education mismatch
Education more than sufficient: Education more than sufficient for the present work.
Education sufficient: Educational level sufficient for the present work.
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Table 2: Estimation results for the wage equation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males
Variables Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
Common variables
Constant 4.911 (21.16) 5.300 (9.21) 4.910 (20.28) 5.536 (9.92) 5.518 (41.69) 4.982 (9.12) 5.290 (36.01) 5.246 (10.05)
Indefinite contract 0.111 (2.86) 0.064 (1.76) 0.092 (2.39) 0.057 (1.62) 0.123 (3.13) 0.112 (3.07) 0.102 (2.61) 0.088 (2.54)
Seniority 0.005 (1.67) 0.008 (4.58) 0.005 (1.64) 0.008 (5.04) 0.005 (1.89) 0.006 (4.26) 0.006 (2.25) 0.007 (5.05)
Gross wage control 0.305 (7.95) 0.137 (4.45) 0.307 (7.96) 0.121 (4.05) 0.302 (7.53) 0.182 (5.74) 0.286 (7.18) 0.125 (4.08)
Occupations:
  Occupation 1 0.663 (4.03) 0.431 (0.79) 0.653 (3.88) 0.224 (0.42) 1.239 (9.07) 1.983 (3.62) 1.159 (8.33) 1.510 (2.88)
  Occupation 2 0.433 (2.27) 0.260 (0.46) 0.446 (2.34) 0.134 (0.25) 0.583 (3.48) 1.729 (3.07) 0.530 (3.20) 1.309 (2.44)
  Occupation 3 0.491 (1.70) -0.605 (0.75) 0.473 (1.65) -0.913 (1.17) 0.412 (1.46) -0.055 (0.06) 0.411 (1.48) -0.583 (0.72)
  Occupation 5 0.467 (2.10) 0.063 (0.12) 0.479 (2.16) -0.018 (0.04) 0.291 (1.34) 0.993 (1.82) 0.328 (1.52) 0.729 (1.40)
Other individual variables
Age 0.017 (1.77) 0.034 (3.61) 0.015 (1.50) 0.021 (2.30)
Age squared (/100) -0.021 (1.75) -0.041 (3.59) -0.018 (1.48) -0.026 (2.32)
Education:
  Primary school -0.108 (1.44) 0.048 (1.02) -0.114 (1.53) 0.032 (0.72)
  Secondary school -0.027 (0.26) 0.204 (2.88) -0.067 (0.65) 0.137 (1.98)
  Vocational training -0.085 (0.83) 0.116 (1.57) -0.089 (0.88) 0.070 (0.97)
  University degree (interm.) 0.140 (1.27) 0.342 (4.06) 0.118 (1.07) 0.284 (3.45)
  University degree (higher) 0.303 (2.55) 0.577 (6.23) 0.224 (1.87) 0.473 (5.21)
Industrial sector:
  Agriculture 0.080 (0.29) 0.070 (0.37) 0.074 (0.27) 0.009 (0.05)
  Basic industry 0.523 (5.00) 0.348 (1.94) 0.509 (4.84) 0.248 (1.44)
  Heavy industry 0.464 (3.94) 0.364 (2.04) 0501 (4.26) 0.319 (1.86)
  Light industry 0.196 (1.86) 0.178 (1.01) 0.209 (2.00) 0.107 (0.63)
  Building 0.464 (3.38) 0.316 (1.76) 0.476 (3.49) 0.246 (1.43)
  Retailing and Hotels 0.347 (3.82) 0.091 (0.52) 0.350 (3.84) 0.030 (0.18)
  Transport 0.388 (3.12) 0.380 (2.11) 0.357 (2.82) 0.321 (1.86)
  Economics services 0.320 (3.01) 0.425 (2.40) 0.332 (3.14) 0.335 (1.97)
  Public Administration 0.538 (5.98) 0.324 (1.86) 0.560 (6.23) 0.283 (1.70)
  Reproduction 0.397 (4.11) 0.210 (1.16) 0.412 (4.29) 0.260 (1.50)
  Social services 0.400 (3.34) 0.015 (0.07) 0.394 (3.31) -0.018 (0.10)
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Region:
  Andalucia 0.305 (2.47) -0.338 (3.16) 0.265 (2.09) -0.186 (1.73)
  Aragón 0.188 (1.41) -0.294 (2.53) 0.125 (0.93) -0.124 (1.07)
  Asturias 0.081 (0.57) -0.243 (1.99) -0.017 (0.12) -0.082 (0.67)
  Baleares 0.260 (1.84) -0.446 (3.19) 0.248 (1.75) -0.188 (1.33)
  Canarias -0.108 (0.73) -0.581 (4.55) -0.095 (0.63) -0.399 (3.12)
  Cantabria 0.270 (1.54) -0.383 (2.78) 0.227 (1.27) -0.183 (1.33)
  Castilla-La Mancha 0.053 (0.34) -0.359 (2.72) 0.005 (0.03) -0.161 (1.23)
  Castilla-León 0.038 (0.26) -0.344 (2.91) 0.006 (0.04) -0.222 (1.85)
  Cataluña 0.263 (2.24) -0.275 (2.61) 0.192 (1.57) 0.122 (1.16)
  Comunidad Valenciana 0.162 (1.36) -0.289 (2.73) 0.107 (0.88) -0.107 (0.99)
  Extremadura 0.014 (0.09) -0.636 (5.01) -0.035 (0.08) -0.444 (3.48)
  Galicia -0.009 (0.07) -0.390 (3.56) -0.084 (0.65) -0.253 (2.30)
  Madrid 0.228 (1.96) -0.201 (1.92) 0.181 (1.54) -0.043 (0.41)
  Murcia 0.363 (2.46) -0.342 (2.22) 0.342 (2.31) -0.073 (0.47)
  Navarra 0.220 (1.12) -0.316 (2.17) 0.187 (0.96) -0.169 (1.18)
  País Vasco 0.319 (2.54) -0.213 (1.92) 0.283 (2.20) -0.103 (0.93)
Job characteristics:
Autonomy:
  Own work 0.043 (1.18) 0.058 (2.05) 0.024 (0.62) 0.080 (2.70)
  Working pace 0.011 (0.31) 0.069 (2.39) 0.034 (0.98) 0.083 (2.83)
  Working hours 0.054 (1.10) 0.044 (1.17) 0.062 (1.19) 0.039 (0.99)
Degree of control:
  Quality control 0.029 (1.24) -0.006 (0.33) 0.070 (2.98) 0.014 (0.73)
  Quantity control -0.045 (2.08) -0.011 (0.58) -0.038 (1.84) -0.030 (1.53)
Directive power over employees
  Director 0.241 (2.31) 0.251 (4.36) 0.150 (1.35) 0.274 (4.62)
  Supervisor 0.101 (2.13) 0.139 (3.83) 0.120 (2.34) 0.180 (4.79)
Power to make decisions:
  Raising a worker’s salary -1.221 (1.64) 0.253 (1.84) -1.566 (1.94) 0.300 (2.04)
  Penalising a worker 0.134 (0.71) 0.062 (0.63) 0.059 (0.30) 0.029 (0.28)
  Changing methods 0.026 (0.20) 0.067 (0.95) 0.076 (0.55) 0.047 (0.67)
Education mismatch:
  Education more than sufficient 0.106 (1.69) -0.001 (0.01) 0.208 (3.37) -0.038 (0.85)
  Education sufficient 0.115 (2.01) -0.013 (0.34) 0.172 (2.95) -0.052 (1.29)
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Correction terms:
λ -0.032 (1.09) -0.007 (0.27) -0.033 (1.09) -0.003 (0.12) -0.033 (1.40) -0.098 (4.65) -0.029 (1.18) -0.063 (3.15)
(φ / F)1 -0.179 (2.33) -0.058 (0.82) -0.175 (2.24) -0.031 (0.45) -0.384 (5.94) -0.338 (5.93) -0.356 (5.56) -0.288 (5.33)
(φ / F)2 -0.013 (0.12) -0.034 (0.32) -0.037 (0.34) -0.010 (0.10) 0.081 (0.77) -0.253 (2.47) 0.078 (0.74) -0.182 (1.87)
(φ / F)3 -0.242 (1.60) 0.433 (1.39) -0.242 (1.61) 0.531 (1.77) -0.080 (0.52) 0.659 (2.00) -0.110 (0.72) 0.749 (2.40)
(φ / F)4 0.213 (2.21) 0.089 (0.31) 0.207 (2.15) 0.046 (0.17) 0.302 (3.17) 0.613 (2.05) 0.265 (2.80) 0.475 (1.67)
(φ / F)5 -0.135 (1.01) 0.027 (0.40) -0.140 (1.02) 0.049 (0.76) 0.086 (0.65) 0.245 (4.46) -0.028 (0.21) 0.217 (4.17)
Observations 651 968 651 968 651 968 651 968
Adjusted R-squared 0.5247 0.4830 0.5387 0.5269 0.4142 0.3681 0.4402 0.4405
Omitted dummies are: illiterate, domestic services, La Rioja and occupation 4.
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               Table 3: Wage gap decomposition (%)
Discrimination Differences in
characteristics
Model 1 14.15 -0.61
Model 2 11.47 2.07
Model 3 14.81 -1.27
Model 4 10.95 2.59
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics for wage earners
Females Males
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Hourly wage (log) 6.266 0.517 6.401 0.505
Hourly wage (pesetas) 609.4 409.5 696.6 501.6
Indefinite contract 0.665 0.472 0.781 0.414
Age 33.48 10.25 38.50 11.63
Seniority 7.67 7.30 11.01 10.18
Education
  Illiterate 0.042 0.201 0.075 0.263
  Primary school 0.496 0.500 0.515 0.500
  Secondary school 0.109 0.312 0.109 0.312
  Vocational training 0.088 0.284 0.097 0.296
  University degree  (interm.) 0.173 0.378 0.076 0.265
  University degree (higher) 0.079 0.271 0.077 0.266
Industrial sector
  Agriculture 0.003 0.055 0.034 0.182
  Basic industry 0.066 0.249 0.106 0.308
  Heavy industry 0.039 0.194 0.115 0.319
  Light industry 0.121 0.326 0.146 0.354
  Building 0.021 0.144 0.103 0.305
  Retailing and Hotels 0.192 0.394 0.117 0.322
  Transport 0.027 0.162 0.069 0.254
  Economics services 0.060 0.238 0.096 0.294
  Public Administration 0.194 0.396 0.115 0.319
  Reproduction 0.204 0.403 0.079 0.270
  Social services 0.031 0.174 0.014 0.117
  Domestic services 0.026 0.160 0.004 0.064
Region
  Andalucía 0.092 0.289 0.130 0.337
  Aragón 0.045 0.207 0.043 0.204
  Asturias 0.028 0.165 0.028 0.165
  Baleares 0.028 0.165 0.016 0.126
  Canarias 0.026 0.159 0.025 0.158
  Cantabria 0.013 0.111 0.017 0.129
  Castilla-La Mancha 0.022 0.147 0.020 0.139
  Castilla-León 0.030 0.171 0.037 0.188
  Cataluña 0.165 0.372 0.148 0.355
  Comunidad Valenciana 0.110 0.313 0.133 0.340
  Extremadura 0.024 0.153 0.025 0.155
  Galicia 0.057 0.232 0.079 0.269
  Madrid 0.213 0.410 0.175 0.380
  Murcia 0.025 0.156 0.011 0.116
  Navarra 0.008 0.091 0.013 0.114
  País Vasco 0.093 0.291 0.085 0.280
  La Rioja 0.012 0.110 0.009 0.196
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Occupation
  Occupation1 0.312 0.464 0.185 0.389
  Occupation2 0.273 0.446 0.182 0.386
  Occupation3 0.102 0.302 0.056 0.230
  Occupation4 0.173 0.378 0.072 0.259
  Occupation5 0.141 0.348 0.505 0.500
Job characteristics
Autonomy
  Own work 0.447 0.498 0.467 0.499
  Working pace 0.352 0.479 0.341 0.474
  Working hours 0.123 0.329 0.176 0.381
Degree of control
  Quality control 2.071 0.947 2.261 0.929
  Quantity control 2.108 0.980 2.121 0.938
Directive power over employees
  Director 0.022 0.148 0.075 0.264
  Supervisor 0.115 0.319 0.157 0.364
Power to make decisions
  Raising a worker’s salary 0.001 0.019 0.012 0.120
  Penalising a worker 0.007 0.083 0.024 0.154
  Changing methods 0.013 0.114 0.035 0.183
Education mismatch
  More than sufficient 0.332 0.471 0.274 0.446
  Sufficient 0.586 0.493 0.610 0.488
Gross wage control 0.188 0.391 0.220 0.415
Observations 651 968
25
               Table A.2: Probit estimates of the participation equation
Females Males
Variables Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat.
Age 0.026 (1.08) 0.132 (5.14)
Age squared (/100) -0.034 (1.14) -0.166 (5.43)
Married -0.228 (1.77) 0.004 (0.02)
Education of partner:
Primary education -0.108 (0.89) -0.019 (0.14)
Secondary education 0.354 (1.92) -0.050 (0.24)
Vocational training 0.068 (0.34) 0.029 (0.09)
University diploma 0.565 (3.22) 0.524 (2.26)
University degree 0.428 (2.63) 0.524 (2.26)
Education:
Primary school 0.336 (2.49) 0.229 (1.55)
Secondary school 0.778 (4.52) 0.327 (1.79)
Vocational training 0.530 (3.03) 0.462 (2.50)
University degree (intermediate) 0.899 (5.94) 0.173 (0.99)
University degree (higher) 0.643 (3.88) 0.274 (1.77)
Household variables:
Head of household 0.503 (4.55) 0.456 (2.96)
Number of children -0.092 (2.46) 0.056 (1.27)
Number of dependent adults 0.110 (2.92) 0.176 (4.74)
Number of income earners -0.289 (5.16) -0.596 (11.80)
Region:
Andalucia -1.110 (2.21) -0.662 (1.07)
Aragón -0.865 (1.65) -0.041 (0.06)
Asturias -0.909 (1.79) -0.175 (0.26)
Baleares -0.248 (0.43) -0.173 (0.25)
Canarias -1.167 (2.18) -0.775 (1.20)
Cantabria -0.515 (0.80) -0.024 (0.03)
Castilla-La Mancha -1.205 (2.29) -0.274 (0.42)
Castilla-León -1.365 (2.66) -0.309 (0.49)
Cataluña -0.605 (1.21) 0.058 (0.09)
Comunidad Valenciana -0.773 (1.53) -0.354 (0.57)
Extremadura -1.121 (2.06) -0.501 (0.77)
Galicia -1.020 (1.98) -0.240 (0.38)
Madrid -0.751 (1.51) -0.139 (0.22)
Murcia -0.715 (1.33) -0.869 (1.32)
Navarra -0.872 (1.48) 0.0222 (0.03)
País Vasco -0.922 (1.80) -0.533 (0.84)
Constant 0.278 (0.42) -1.510 (1.91)
Observations 1701 1986
Log L -994.765 -708.037
Omitted dummies: Not married, illiterate, illiterate partner, not being head of the household and
La Rioja.
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Table A.3: Multinomial logit for occupational choice (females)






































Age 0.078 -0.010 -0.020 0.011
(3.72) (0.36) (0.76) (0.54)
Years of education 0.667 0.416 0.146 -0.028
(6.72) (4.64) (1.38) (0.33)
Father’s years of education 0.123 0.107 0.076 -0.032
(2.13) (1.95) (1.18) (0.52)
Married 0.276 0.337 -0.412 -0.522
(0.54) (0.71) (0.75) (1.19)
Constant -9.929 -3.892 -1.160 0.423




Table A.4: Multinomial logit for occupational choice (males)






































Age 0.059 0.033 0.001 -0.016
(2.99) (2.44) (0.03) (0.86)
Years of education 0.593 0.338 0.163 0.050
(11.38) (8.04) (3.17) (1.14)
Father’s years of education 0.145 0.096 0.084 -0.002
(3.77) (3.25) (2.30) (0.04)
Married 0.172 0.332 0.032 0.396
(0.44) (1.10) (0.08) (0.82)
Constant -10.743 -6.166 -4.014 -2.002
(10.61) (8.61) (5.23) (2.73)
Observations 968
Log L -1006.882
